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Abstract
At the forefront of the game theoreticians who conceived of concepts that contributed to
peace research and conceptualized strategies that could promote international
cooperation, Professor Anatol Rapoport used simple game theory in the classroom to
generate ideas about how to enhance world peace. The basic logic of game theory is
explained using his game models of ‘Chicken’ and ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’. Rapoport’s
revolutionary ideas about how to promote international and national cooperation are
overviewed; for instance he developed a simple strategy, Tit for Tat, to help minimize
conflict that won two computer tournaments, and he taught scholars to consider the risks
of nuclear deterrence. He was one of North America’s pre-eminent peace researchers and
his legacy will live on for generations of future scholars and policy makers.
Keywords: chicken game, cooperation, game theory, peace research, prisoner’s dilemma,
Rapoport
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Game theory is usually used to rationally and dispassionately examine the
strategic behaviour of nations, especially superpower behaviour. Game models are used
to describe and explain all types of situations, as well as to prescribe how rational leaders
or countries should act in given situations. Economists have their own models of supply
and demand and, similarly scientists and political analysts often use game theoretical
models to understand the underlying structure of conflict. Dr. Rapoport’s contributions to
game theory were solidly in the area of peace research, an important sub-field of political
science and international relations. Rapoport was a recognized leader in peace research
world-wide. He was particularly well-known as one who was also highly respected in
peace and conflict studies and in the military and strategic studies community.
This article explains how basic game theory—at its simplest level—was used by
Professor Anatol Rapoport to generate ideas about how to enhance world peace.
Rapoport was at the forefront of the game theoreticians who sought to conceptualize
strategies that could promote international cooperation. Accordingly, the basic logic of
game theory is explained using the game models of ‘Chicken’ and ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’.
These models were used by Rapoport in his books and lectures in simple and complex
ways. Then Rapoport’s revolutionary ideas about how to promote international and
national cooperation are overviewed. He developed a simple strategy called Tit for Tat
which won two computer tournaments. Rapoport suggested that applying his strategy to
real-life problems could help prevent human vulnerability and minimize conflict. Finally,
this article considers the inherent dangers of game theory and nuclear deterrence in the
way that Rapoport taught young scholars to contemplate their risks.
Background of Anatol Rapoport
Dr. Anatol Rapoport was born May 22, 1911 in Lozova, Ukraine to a family of
Jewish socialists that fled the Soviet Union while he was still a boy and settled in the
United States. He went to school in Chicago and afterwards studied music in Vienna from
1929 to 1934. Until 1937 he was active as an international concert pianist and even in his
later years as his memory waned, he could play the piano expertly from memory. He
began a second study in mathematics at the University of Chicago (PhD in Mathematics,
1941). After military service Rapoport began his scientific career and research at the
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Illinois Institute of Technology, Chicago, in 1946. From 1955 to 1970 Rapoport was
professor at the Mental Health Institute of the University of Michigan. In 1970 he
transferred as a professor of psychology and mathematics to the University of Toronto.
Then he became the director of the Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna in 1980. In
1984, Rapoport moved back to Canada where he was a long-serving professor at the
University of Toronto; the co-founder of its Peace and Conflict Studies Program; and
president of a well-known society that continues to debate, ‘Science for Peace’. He died
in 2007 in his 96th year.
Known worldwide as one of game theory’s most pre-eminent theorists, Rapoport
published more than 400 contributions to game theory, mathematical biology, semantics,
systems theory, and peace research. He wrote two classic works: Fights, games and
debates (1961) and Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in Conflict and Cooperation (1965), and
he wrote and edited many other books on game theory, the best known of which are: Nperson game theory: concepts and applications (1970); The big two: Soviet-American
perceptions of foreign policy (1971); Conflict in man-made environment (1974); Game
theory as a theory of conflict resolution (1974); The 2 X 2game (1976); Mathematical
Models in the Social and Behavioral Sciences (1983); and Decision theory and decision
behaviour: normative and descriptive approaches (1989). Later in life, Rapoport
contributed two seminal volumes to peace research: The Origins of Violence: Approaches
to the Study of Conflict (1989) and Peace: An Idea Whose Time Has Come (1992). These
ground-breaking texts continued to be used by students and scholars in the University of
Toronto’s program of Peace and Conflict Studies, which Dr. Rapoport co-founded, and
they are still used in many other specialized peace and conflict studies programs.
According to the Oxford International Encyclopedia of Peace, Rapoport occupies
an important place in the development of peace research. He emphasized the importance
of pacifism—the refusal to participate in the system of war—and he focused on abolition
of war including nuclear abolition. Professor Rapoport’s contributions to the field of
peace research were complex and manifold. As the model of a ‘passionate, engaged
intellectual’ he contributed to system theory, game theory and the study of human
cooperation. He believed that the systematic scholarly inquiry of peace research was
powerfully important (Young, 2010). Rapoport also contributed to peace research by
teaching that value-free research and positivism should be criticized. He believed
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behavioural science could not be value-free: “as a rule the assumptions made in natural
science do not affect the material under study; in behavioural science they do” (Eckhardt
1983).
Rapoport became involved with peace research in the mid-1950s. He argued that
scientists should work for peace and should not prioritize war, despite practical realities,
especially regarding Vietnam from 1965 onward. His scholarly work was embedded in the
multidisciplinary ideal and the behavioural revolution. His use of analytical tools, namely
mathematics established the basis for a new criticism of deterrence theory. Rapoport
joined his skills in mathematics and formal logic with those of biologist Ludwig von
Bertalanffy, economist Kenneth E. Boulding and psychologist Ralph W. Gerard to found
the Society for the Advancement of General Systems Theory in support of what came to
be known as the systems movement. He took a non-realist approach to conflict and
identified the creative exploration of analogies, especially those deducible from
mathematical models. In the 1970s he was President of the Peace Research Society
(International) and of the Canadian Peace Research and Education Association. He
received the Lentz International Peace Research Award in 1975. The end of détente by
the late 1970s and the intensification of Cold War dynamics during the Reagan years led
him to intensify his search for peace research conceptions, proposing new forms of
bipolar confrontation logic and common security. Rapoport was at the forefront of those
game theoreticians who sought to propose alternative ways to conceptualize strategies
that could promote international cooperation.
With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the bipolar system, game theory
lost much of its former popularity (McMillan, 1992; Powell, 1999) although it continued
to preoccupy scholars and educators. This article explains how basic game theory—at its
simplest level—was used by Rapoport to generate ideas about how to enhance world
peace. Many of his books on game theory are difficult to understand from a mathematical
perspective, but he believed the basic lessons of game theory could be taught to
everyone using chalk and a blackboard. He was often found standing in front of the
classroom at the University of Toronto, wearing a snappy blue beret, surrounded by
clouds of chalk dust. He would draw the essential boxes that make up a matrix in game
theory with so much vigour that his piece of chalk would break. Already in his eighties, he
continued to teach part-time decades after official retirement.
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The Basic Logic of Game Theory Using Two Game Models: Chicken and Prisoner’s
Dilemma.
Two game models were used by Rapoport in his books in complex and
sophisticated ways. For those less well versed in mathematics—and in order to better
appreciate Rapoport’s fine contribution to peace studies – the models are explained here
as he explained them during his first few lectures in the classroom. Then Rapoport’s
revolutionary ideas about how to promote international and national cooperation are
overviewed. He remains well-known more than a decade after his death because he
developed a simple game theoretical concept, called Tit for Tat (TFT) which won two
famous computer tournaments. He suggested that applying TFT to real-life problems
could help formulate preventive measures that reduce human vulnerability and minimize
conflict. Finally, the essay reflects upon the inherent dangers of game theory and nuclear
deterrence just as Dr. Rapoport taught many scholars to contemplate their risks. He felt
very responsible to counsel students and scholars of peace research and game theory to
be careful about wielding game theory’s arcane language for nefarious ends.
Game 1: ‘Chicken’ or Deterrence Model
It is helpful to first explain the concepts of a ‘matrix’, and a ‘payoff’ with reference
to the game of Chicken. The Chicken model was often used to illustrate the logic—or
illogic—of deterrence strategy; however, it is also useful for explaining the basic logic of
game theory and the ‘minimax’ principle.
Chicken was developed by Daniel Ellsberg, a strategic analyst at RAND, the
American think-tank. He wanted to create a ‘machine’ for asking useful questions and for
preliminary testing of alleged answers about nuclear deterrence. The model was based on
a daredevil game played by teenagers in the United States. Two groups would pile into
cars and drive full-speed at each other with their cars straddling the middle of the road.
The first driver to swerve to avoid collision would be the loser, earning the nickname
‘chicken’. But both drivers would be losers if they collided.
The choices that face both drivers—Rapoport called them Sam and Ivan (but they
could be any other adversaries, like Donald Trump and Kim Jong Un)—can be illustrated
using a rectangular box called a matrix. Sam’s choices are listed in the horizontal rows,
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while Ivan’s choices are ordered in the columns vertically. In the simple two-player game
of Chicken, Sam and Ivan each has two choices—to swerve or not to swerve—but there
are four possible outcomes and four possible ‘payoffs’ for each player. A payoff is defined
as the outcome of both players’ decisions.
Figure 1
‘Chicken’ or Deterrence Game
Ivan (column)
Swerve (cooperate)
Sam
(row)

Swerve
(cooperate)

Don’t Swerve (threaten)
+1

+1

Don’t Swerve
(threaten)

+10
-10

-10
+10

-100
-100

To illustrate, let us assign some numbers for the possible payoffs for Sam and Ivan, and
examine these payoffs closely:
1.

2.
3.
4.

If Sam decides to swerve off the road at the last second—but so does Ivan—both
will be seen by their friends as lacking in courage—as ‘chickens’. But they do earn
some status at least for playing the game—so we will give them each a single
point or +1 (upper-left box)
If Sam swerves, and Ivan does not, then Sam looks like a chicken—in this case the
payoff for Sam would be -10 points—and Ivan wins—let us say this is worth +10
points to him (upper-right box).
However, if Sam decides not to swerve, and Ivan swerves, Sam earns +10 points,
and Ivan receives - 10 points (lower-left box).
But if both Sam and Ivan decide not to swerve, the rather grisly outcome could be
calculated as - 100 points for Sam, and - 100 points for Ivan (lower-right box).
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Evidently, the game of chicken was meant to mirror the calculations that the
superpowers made about nuclear deterrence. In a situation of deterrence, both the
United States and the Soviet Union (or North Korea) could threaten to ‘go to the brink’
and use nuclear weapons. But if neither backed down, there would be a nuclear war and
both players would suffer enormous costs. The costs of playing the ‘game’ of deterrence
would outweigh the benefits of going to the brink.
In this sort of situation, what might Sam or Ivan (or Trump or Kim Jong Un) decide
to do? According to traditional game theory, Sam should make his decision by considering
all the worst possible consequences of each of his choices. Then he should choose so as
to avoid the worst conceivable outcome. In game theory this course of action was
referred to as the ‘minimax’ or the ‘maximin’ principle (or the von Neumann principle).
Sam should look for the payoff where his minimal payoff is maximal—in other words, he
should try to make the best of the worst behaviour of his opponent.
As Dr. Rapoport pointed out, if both Sam and Ivan choose according to the
maximin principle, they would both decide to swerve in order to avoid the worst payoff—a perfectly rational solution. Similarly, game theorists pointed out that in a crisis
situation, the enormous costs for the United States and the Soviet Union of carrying out a
strategy of Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) would not be borne by rational decisionmakers. Thus, MAD would not be perceived by either side as a credible strategy of conflict
avoidance because the costs of possible nuclear war far outweighed the benefits of going
to the brink and threatening possible retaliation. Moreover, if MAD was not seen as
credible, the Soviet Union might threaten a conventional or limited nuclear attack against
Western Europe, knowing full well that the United States would back down because of
the enormous costs of all-out nuclear retaliation. The problem, then, for game
theoreticians became how to signal that the American nuclear threat was credible—that
the United States would risk some measure of destruction, for example, for the sake of
Berlin, Korea, or Cuba.
A few solutions to this conceptual conundrum emerged from game theory. As
Rapoport pithily explained, the famous nuclear strategist Herman Kahn advised the
following winning strategy: in full view of the opponent, tear off the steering wheel and
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throw it away. In this manner, the opponent will become convinced of your resolve, for
now he knows that you could not swerve even if you wanted to. Taking this line of
reasoning one step further, Kahn recognized that just as Sam, showing his resolve, yanks
his steering wheel off, Ivan might get the same idea and do the same thing, creating a
problem for both parties. As Rapoport explains, ‘If one remembers that it is not only the
two imbeciles’ lives that are put on the line in the global game of chicken but practically
everyone else’s, one begins to realize the dangers involved in indulging in strategic
analysis from only one strategist’s point of view’ (1971:180-81; 1985: 179-81). The basic
question—how to credibly threaten to go the brink—continues to preoccupy game
theorists concerned with making deterrence work (for example, Brams and Kilgour, 1988;
Powell, 1990; Paul et. al 2009). But Rapoport was at the forefront of those who
forthrightly argued that ‘this fixation on the zero-sum paradigm, together with the
inability to break away from the imperatives of individual rationality, prevent the military
from designing a way out of the impasse created by the threat of total extinction’ (1985:
180).
Deterrence and the Intellectual Poverty of Signalling Resolve in the Chicken Model
The problem of how to signal resolve in a nuclear deterrence situation will
probably never be solved. How should the United States signal to an adversary, for
example, that if it attacks—using nuclear, chemical or biological weapons—that the US
may use its nuclear weapons? Nevertheless, game theoreticians have gone to great
lengths to try to derive game-theoretical solutions to the problem. Rather than admit that
the strategy of nuclear deterrence should be re-examined and revised, game theorists
experimented with many possible solutions to the problem.
It was evident in his classes that Rapoport had little patience with the work by
theoreticians who tried to formulate complex concepts (e.g. ‘robust threats’,
‘probabilistic doomsday machine’) and mathematical proofs (e.g. ‘backward induction’,
‘conditional probability’) to show that it can be rational, in certain circumstances, to issue
a nuclear threat (Brams and Kilgour, 1988: 38-53, 74-94). While game theorists’ attention
shifted to modelling nuclear rivalry, deterrence theory, and crisis stability, including the
effects of first-strike advantages, limited retaliation, and the number of nuclear powers in
the international system on the dynamics of escalation, (for example, Harvey, 1997)
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Rapoport broadened his academic focus to write books that explained theories of peace
research, the origins of violence, and ideas about semantics and systems theory. He
continued to publish extensive research on game theory but he embraced the game of
‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’, rather than ‘Chicken’, in books like Prisoner’s Dilemma: A Study in
Conflict and Cooperation (1965); The 2 X 2 Game (1976); and Mathematical Models in the
Social and Behavioral Sciences (1983). His major contributions to game theory revolve
around the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) model because it reveals, in devastatingly clear
terms, the underlying structural conflict that bedevils most systemic-, state-, and
individual-level conflicts.
Game 2: ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma’ Model
Rapoport used the Prisoner’s Dilemma game to neatly demonstrate how humans
and nations can get into threatening sorts of situations—and how the structure of a
situation can force everyone to continue to endure insecurity. The Prisoner’s Dilemma
model demonstrates that we can be caught in a dilemma, not because of evil or stupid
leaders, but because of structural imperatives and thinking patterns that dictate choices
where, in order to avoid the worst-case scenario, we end up in a less-than-optimal
situation. In his own words, ‘In the game called Prisoner’s Dilemma, the rational choice of
strategy by both players leads to an outcome which is worse for both than if they had
chosen their strategies ‘irrationally’. The paradox remains unresolved as long as we insist
on adhering to the concept of rationality which makes perfect sense in zero-sum games
but which makes questionable sense in non-zero-sum games. Thus the paradox forces a
re-examination of our concept of rational decision’ (Rapoport and Chammah, 1965: 13).
As Rapoport liked to explain in his classes, the original story of Prisoner’s Dilemma
was formulated in the early 1950s, and the problem it poses continues to preoccupy
policy-makers and academics who think about decision-making. The parable goes
something like this:
Two suspects are taken into custody and placed in separate cells. The prosecutor
is port convinced that they are guilty of a specific crime but he does not have sufficient
evidence to convict them at a trial. Accordingly, he gives each prisoner two alternatives:
to confess—or not to confess—to the crime he is sure they have committed. He tells each
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of them:
‘If you do not confess—if you are silent—I will book you on the lesser charge of
illegal possession of a weapon. You will get a sentence of 1 year in jail.’
‘But,’ he says to each of them separately, ‘if you both confess—if you both
defect—I will prosecute you both but I will recommend less than the most severe
sentence—probably each of you will be sent to jail for 5 years’.
Then the prosecutor goes on to say:
‘However, if one of you confesses and the other does not, then he who confesses will get
lenient treatment because he provided us with evidence—only 3 months in jail—and I
promise that the other prisoner, who does not confess and stays silent, will receive the
maximum sentence—at least 10 years.’
The choices facing each prisoner can be illustrated using a matrix. At this point,
Rapoport would give the prisoners the names of two erstwhile students in the classroom,
but for the sake of clarity here, we will call them Arnold (A) and Bob (B). If we examine
how Arnold (A) reasons, we can obtain insights into the way in which leaders, groups,
nations, and international organizations can also find themselves in a Prisoner’s Dilemma.
To illustrate, let us assign some numbers for the possible payoffs for Arnold and
Bob, and examine these payoffs closely in the matrix (Figure 2) on the following page:
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Figure 2

Prisoner’s Dilemma: Arnold and Bob in Jail
Bob (B)
Cooperate (silence = C)

Defect (confess = D)

B gets 1 year
(-10)
Cooperate

Both silent
(C, C)

(silence = C)

Arnold (A)

A gets 1 year
(-10)

Bob confesses,
Arnold is silent
(C, D)
A gets 10 years
(-100)

B gets 10 years
(-100)

Defect
(confess = D)

B gets 3 months
(-3)

Arnold confesses,
Bob is silent
(D, C)
A gets 3 months
(-3)

Bob gets 5 years
(-50)
Both confess
(D, D)
A gets 5 years
(-50)

-3 = ‘best’, most-preferred outcome
-10 = ‘next best’ or next-preferred outcome
-50 = ‘next worst’ outcome
-100 = ‘worst’ or least-preferred outcome
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Arnold’s Choices: Sitting Alone in Prison
Obviously, Arnold does not know what Bob is planning to do, nor can he
communicate with him from his prison cell, so Arnold calculates as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

If I choose to be silent, and Bob does too, we will both get 1 year in jail (C, C box)
But if I am silent, and Bob confesses, then I get 10 years, and he gets only 3
months
(C, D box)
If I confess, and Bob does not, then I get only 3 months, and he gets 10 years (D, C
box)
But if we both confess, then we both get 5 years (D, D box).

Thus, says Arnold to himself, if I want to avoid the worst outcome—that is 10 years—then
I should not risk being silent. I should confess because the worst that can happen is that I
get 5 years, and I might get only 3 months.
This is Arnold’s reasoning (based on the minimax principle). But, unfortunately,
Bob makes the same calculations. Bob also chooses to confess so as to avoid the worstcase outcome so both Arnold and Bob spend 5 years in prison—a sad ending to a
metaphorical tale.
The principal lesson of Prisoner’s Dilemma is that—despite the existence of a
mutually preferable outcome (the CC box)—the rational calculations of both prisoners in
favour of their own self-interest in avoiding the worst-case outcome dictates that both
end up worse-off. The appeal of Prisoner’s Dilemma lies in the fact that its underlying
logic can apply to a wide variety of threatening situations. For example, the next matrix
(Figure 3) demonstrates the same kinds of calculations leading to an arms race.
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Figure 3
An Arms Race as a Prisoner’s Dilemma
Country B
Cooperate (low arms spending)

Defect (high arms spending)

Country B
Disadvantage
(-10)

Cooperate
(low arms
spending = C)

Country B
Advantage
(+50)

(C, C)
Arms Limitation
Country A

Country A
Disadvantage
(-10)

Defect
(confess = D)

(C, D)
Country A
Serious Disadvantage
(-100)

Country B
Serious Disadvantage
(-100)

Country B
(-50)

(D, C)
Country A
Advantage
(+50)

(D, D)
Arms Race
Country A
(-50)

+50 = ‘best’, most-preferred outcome
-10 = ‘next best’ or next-preferred outcome
-50 = ‘next worst’ outcome
-100 = ‘worst’ or least-preferred outcome
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In this game, Country A would most prefer a situation where it has a superior
weapons system to Country B. For instance, the superior weapons system could be
advanced nuclear submarine technology or a sophisticated anti-ballistic missile system
based in space. However, Country B sees a situation where Country A has superior
firepower as its worst-case scenario; consequently, it develops its own weapons. These
could be modernized anti-submarine warfare systems or thousands of decoys designed to
trick tracking systems, satellites, and lasers in space. As a result, both countries become
entangled in an arms race, although the costs of an arms race are higher than agreeing to
some sort of arms limitation agreement.
It should be pointed out that in this simple Prisoner’s Dilemma model, the two
players need not be the obvious ones—the United States versus Russia. The parties could
be India versus Pakistan; North Korea versus South Korea and Japan; or al Qaeda’s
network versus the United States and the NATO allies. Prisoner’s Dilemma also describes
many conceivable scenarios other than arms races. The choices facing Group A or Group
B could be between:
•

•

cooperating with other countries to impose sanctions against a violator country (e.g.
cooperating to impose sanctions on Iran)—or defecting from an international
agreement to impose sanctions (e.g. loosening trade restrictions with Iran’s military
regime).
cooperating with other countries to limit weapons stockpiles (e.g. ratifying the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty)—or choosing to export certain weapon systems (e.g.
modernizing NATO’s ‘dual-use’ weapons systems in Turkey)

Prisoner’s Dilemma can apply to a myriad of particular cases, such as businesses
cooperating together to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, governments seeking to
control landmines, or the United Nations (UN) attempting to mobilize member states for
peace support operations. The choices could be between:
•

cooperating with an adversary to reduce forces and military equipment, such as
cooperating with Russia to reduce NATO’s weapons arsenal in Europe—or
reneging from serious arms limitation talks, such as failing to honour the
Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty
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•

•

cooperating with the general trends of arms control agreements, such as
honouring the as-yet-unratified Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty—or choosing to
modernize nuclear weapon systems, such as making plans to erect ground- and
space-based ballistic missile defence systems and modernizing nuclear weapons
arsenals
cooperating with adversaries to negotiate peace agreements, such as cooperating
among the NATO allies and Russia in order to pursue peace negotiations about
how to deal with armed rebel groups in Ukraine’s eastern area – or choosing not
to negotiate peace agreements about how to deal with armed rebel groups,
including for example rejecting the prospect of peace negotiations about how to
deal with ISIS in Syria and Iraq among the NATO allies including with Russia and
Syria’s pro-Assad forces.

In all these cases there are great advantages to being the only one to defect, however, if
both or all parties defect, it works out to everyone’s disadvantage. Thus, Prisoner’s
Dilemma starkly illustrates how spirals of insecurity can develop. It shows how parties can
be trapped in security dilemmas—not because of stupid or irrational calculations—but
because of thinking patterns or ‘decision rules’ where each group seeks to avoid the
worst-case scenario at all costs, and where each player is unwilling to risk the costs of
cooperating if the other player also does not cooperate.
Rapoport’s Contribution to Cooperative Game Theory
A great deal of scholarly work tests the intricacies of the Chicken and Prisoner’s
Dilemma games. For example, Jurišić et al., after reviewing the relevant literature up to
2012, concluded ‘Prisoner’s dilemma is still a current research area with nearly 15,000
papers during the past two years.’ (Jurišić M, Kermek D, Konecki M, 2012; quoted in
Rapoport, Seale and Coleman, 2015). Rapoport believed a basic understanding of both
models’ underlying logic could help devise creative strategies to promote international
cooperation. As he repeatedly showed, a game theoretical framework can help generate
useful ideas and unusual solutions that enhance human security. Taking a simple
approach could help generate solutions and detect problems with these same ideas. His
concept of ‘Tit for Tat’ was a very simple idea, yet it generated some amazing discoveries.
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Rapoport’s strategy of ‘Tit for Tat’ (TFT)
In his lectures, Rapoport explained the idea that costs and benefits need not be
one-time pay-offs, but can be incurred or appreciated more than once over time. As he
would ask, what happens if we play Prisoner’s Dilemma over and over again? In other
words, what happens if two players know that they will interact repeatedly? In game
theory, this is referred to as an ‘iterated’ Prisoner’s Dilemma.
To answer this question, political scientist Robert Axelrod invited experts to
submit programs for a Computer Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament. He wrote a nine-page
article in 1981 and a 1984 book with the same title, The Evolution of Cooperation, about
the results. Decades later, the article is still one of the most cited articles ever published
in the journal Science (Axelrod and W.D. Hamilton, 1981; Axelrod, 1984). Scores of game
theoreticians continue to test his findings under various computer, human, and
laboratory conditions (for example, Betz, 1991; Busch and Reinhardt, 1993; Simpson,
1990, 2001; Kretz, 2011; Axelrod, 2012; Hilbe C., Traulsen A., Sigmund K. 2015; Rapoport,
Seale and Colman, 2015).
Axelrod first set up the tournament so that each computer program would interact
with other programs, and each program would be matched against itself, as well as
against Random—a program that randomly cooperated and defected with equal
probability. In the first round-robin, each game consisted of exactly two hundred moves,
there were 14 separate strategies, and the game was run five times so there were
240,000 separate choices. The strategy that won the tournament, because it attained the
highest average score compared to any other entry, was the simplest of all the submitted
programs. It was formulated by Rapoport. His strategy, Tit for Tat (TFT), began with a
cooperative choice and then did whatever the other player did on the previous move. The
reasons for the success of the strategy of TFT were that:
• it was nice by starting off with cooperation;
• it was retaliatory immediately in the case of defection—it defected once after
each defection by the other;
• but it was forgiving if the adversary cooperated again
• and it was not too clever, but it was very clear—consequently, it was easy for
other programs to figure out its strategy.
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Then Axelrod ran another tournament. This time, however, all the participants
knew TFT had won the first round so many tried to design entries to beat TFT. Strategies
such as Stab in the Back defected on the last move; strategies such as Tester defected
immediately; while Tranquillizer lulled the other player into cooperation, and then tried
to get away with defection. In this tournament, Axelrod also remedied a problem arising
out of the first round robin related to the finite number of moves. He was able to more
closely mirror reality by ensuring that minor endgame effects were eliminated (e.g. in this
round robin, the game did not end after 200 finite moves; instead, the end of the game
was probabilistic with a .00346 chance of ending the game with each given move.)
In the second tournament, there were 63 different strategies, and more than a million
plays. There were many programs designed to be nice and forgiving; while other
programs tried to take advantage of others if they were nice and forgiving. Anyone could
submit any program but only one person submitted TFT again—Anatol Rapoport. To
everyone’s surprise, TFT won the tournament once more. Thus, the success of TFT led to
some simple, but powerful advice:
• Be nice;
• Practice reciprocity (e.g. cooperate if the other player cooperates but retaliate if
they defect);
• Forgive;
• Try to be as clear as possible.
How might TFT be applied to international relations? First, if Leader A knows that
Leader B will be around for a long time in the foreseeable future, they might conclude
that it would be worthwhile to improve their long-term relationship. In game theoretical
language, ‘the shadow of the future’ looms larger in an iterated game. And if there will be
no foreseeable end to their relations, adopting a Tit for Tat strategy could be fruitful
(Simpson, 2001b: 139-49). For more than thirty years, in hundreds of publications, social
and behavioral scientists have propagated the conclusion that TFT is the appropriate
strategy to follow in resolving conflicts in dyadic interactions that satisfy the assumptions
underlying the iterated two-person PD game (Rapoport, Amman, 2015). ‘New strategies
are developed and old ones are reused in new areas. But basic rules for cooperation that
were recognized by Axelrod in the first competition are still valid’ (p. 1097).
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The Inherent Dangers of Game Theory and Nuclear Deterrence
Dr. Rapoport made very clear in his classes that game theory is replete with
abstract language and complicated numerical terms—concepts that can be used more to
obfuscate than to clarify. Just as the language of nuclear deterrence and strategic thought
uses many complicated concepts such as flexible response, bolstering and pre-emptive
warfare (Simpson 1990, 2001b, 2009), game theoreticians have their own forbidding
terms (e.g. Nash equilibria, pareto-optimal, non-zero-sum games). Rapoport cautioned
that those who use game theory can experience a kind of thrill at being able to
manipulate the language. And they can also mistakenly feel that they have nuclear
weapons under control. Game theory veils the choices facing humans about their survival
in innocuous quasi-mathematical language. By doing so, game theory desensitises policymakers and scholars to the reality of what they are talking about—which is actually about
using weapons and force to threaten, deter, and kill other humans. As he emphasized,
‘Strategic science is what confers intellectual respectability on the military profession,
deflecting attention from the concrete results of military activity—mass killing and
destruction’ (Rapoport, 1995: 169)
Dr. Rapoport taught generations of students’ game-theoretical styles of reasoning
to generate ideas about how to deal with the broad range of challenges to human
security, such as armed intra-state conflict, gross violations of human rights,
environmental degradation, and nuclear proliferation. He understood that for students,
learning the language of game theory was useful if we want to understand the
abstractions of strategizing—much like mathematicians or physicists have a shared
language. A basic appreciation of game theory also helps to understand the rather
skewed assumptions about ‘rationality’ that underlie traditional military thinking about
deterrence strategy. Indeed, a basic grasp of game theory’s underlying assumptions and
oversimplifications helps develop sufficient game-theoretical parlance to ask
uncomfortable questions of the proponents of deterrence, such as: ‘Can we assume that
decision-makers will act and make decisions rationally during a crisis, such as a nuclear
war?’ (Simpson, 2001a, 2009)
Moreover, Rapoport showed how game theory can be useful for generating
creative strategies that can help cooperation emerge in a world without central
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authority—that is, in a world of supposed ‘anarchy’. His strategy of TFT can be applied to
a myriad of interactions between leaders, groups, countries, alliances, and international
organizations. Taking remedial action—a Tit for Tat approach—based on game theoretical
ideas may (or may not) help reduce all types of conflict. Scholars continue to challenge
the generality of Rapoport’s strategy and point out that TFT is restricted to a particular
combination tournament format, criterion for success, and payoff values (Rapoport, Seale
and Coleman, 2015).
As a famous scholar, Anatol Rapoport (1911-2007) contributed to many key
concepts and terms in peace research, like conflict resolution, deterrence, militarism,
pacifism and rationality and there remains wide agreement that as a public intellectual he
made an enormous contribution to game theory, peace and conflict studies and strategic
studies. He was one of North America’s pre-eminent peace researchers and his legacy will
live on for generations of future scholars and policy makers.
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